Abstract: This research article explores the role of institutional innovation intermediaries in accelerating the commercialisation of (clean) technologies. Drawing on the finance and innovation intermediaries literatures, we show that financial barriers to eco-innovation can be partly overcome by particular functions of institutional innovation intermediaries; this in turn mobilises private finance along the innovation process. Therefore, we empirically evaluate the roles and instruments of institutional innovation intermediaries (innovation intermediation, policy support, public-private cooperation, financial instruments). Our contribution intersects both the finance and the innovation systems literature by exploring the finance mobilisation functions of institutional innovation intermediaries to address barriers to eco-innovation along the innovation process.
Introduction
The ongoing debate about how to mitigate climate change has encouraged policymakers to conduct R&D for eco-innovations. The aim of these initiatives is twofold: firstly, to reduce carbon emissions and, secondly, to foster long-term economic green growth (Strand & Toman 2010; OECD 2009 ).
However, complex system failures occur surrounding the commercialisation of eco-innovations 1 due to high uncertainty, the absence of carbon markets and the resulting technological lock-in (Leitner et al. 2010) . Many firms and research institutes invent technologies that are eventually not introduced to the market because of underinvestment in R&D or other (finance-related) barriers such as imperfect capital markets, scalability, asset intensity, the absence of complementary assets such as infrastructure and an inadequate regulatory environment (Marcus et al. 2013; Kenney & Hargadon 2012; Olmos et al. 2012; Mathews et al. 2010; Haley & Schuler 2011) . The incorporation of the finance perspective at an early stage, including the cooperation of innovative firms and research institutes with financiers, could leverage public and private funds more effectively, enhance innovation activity and finally accelerate the commercialisation and diffusion process.
Consequently, especially for climate change-related eco-innovation, there is huge potential in connecting public support with private finance, because of the persistent information asymmetries between innovators and financiers (Mowery et al. 2010) .
Key actors in the innovation process include institutional (i.e. government-affiliated) intermediaries that play a crucial role in establishing and governing a closer collaboration and in fostering knowledge flows between innovators and financiers to reduce information asymmetries and uncertainty (Kivimaa 2014; Howells 2006; Hoppe & Ozdenoren 2005) . In recent years, a lot of work has been done on innovation intermediaries (Howells 2006; Katzy et al. 2013; Klerkx et al. 2015; Klerkx & Leeuwis 2009; van Lente et al. 2003; Yusuf 2008) , resulting in conceptual and qualitative evidence that institutional innovation intermediaries at the intersection of public and private R&D and commercialisation have beneficial effects (Kivimaa 2014; Klerkx & Leeuwis 2009; Yusuf 2008; van Lente et al. 2003) . More specifically, previous research has looked at their functions (Hoppe & Ozdenoren 2005; Howells 2006 ), how innovation intermediaries enhance userproducer interactions and demand articulation (Boon et al. 2008 (Boon et al. , 2011 , their role in commercialising research (Yusuf 2008) , their interaction with the policy environment (Klerkx & Leeuwis 2009 ) and their broader role with regard to stimulating a transition towards sustainability (Kivimaa 2014; van Lente et al. 2003) .
Although it has been recognised that innovation intermediaries help in mobilising several resources for innovation, the previous literature on innovation intermediaries has not investigated the mobilisation of finance for innovation. If previously separated literature streams on financing innovation and innovation intermediaries are drawn together, it becomes apparent that innovation intermediaries could play an important role in addressing financial barriers to eco-innovation along the innovation cycle, as they hold a critical position between market actors and government (Howells 2006; Kivimaa 2014; Yusuf 2008; Mowery et al. 2010) . As there has been no systematic evaluation of institutional innovation intermediary roles and functions to address barriers to ecoinnovation and correspondingly mobilise private finance, our paper seeks to address this gap by analysing the following research question:
How do institutional innovation intermediaries address the complex set of barriers surrounding (eco-) innovation especially from R&D to commercialisation, with an emphasis on mobilisation of finance?
We address this question in the context of eco-innovation, as innovation system problems such as thin markets for finance, information asymmetries and failing markets for technologies are more pronounced there, but we also believe it to be of relevance for innovation in general. We present qualitative in-depth evidence, exploring institutional innovation intermediaries' finance mobilisation functions and roles. The article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical underpinnings and integrates the streams of literature on innovation finance and innovation intermediaries. Section 3 sketches the methodological approach taken to assess the role of intermediaries and to evaluate their finance mobilisation functions. Section 4 presents the findings, and section 5 interrogates these findings with theory to draw conclusions and to derive policy implications in section 6.
Theoretical background

Financing R&D and innovation
Scholars consider financiers as crucial to support the commercialisation and diffusion of new, clean and low-carbon technologies generated by eco-innovation processes (Hekkert & Negro 2009; Hekkert et al. 2007; Perez 2002; Schumpeter 1939) , and several researchers have highlighted an underinvestment in R&D as a market failure for innovation activity in the early stages (Hall & Lerner 2010; Hall 2002; Myers & Majluf 1984) : Firstly, financiers, from their market logic perspective, cannot evaluate the quality of new research because of its highly uncertain nature (Jaffe et al. 2005; Akerlof 1970; Arrow 1962) . Possible gains from R&D cannot be fully appropriated by the firm because of knowledge spill-overs, i.e. the social returns are higher than the private return appropriated (Jaffe et al. 2005; Griliches 1992 ). Secondly, imperfections in capital markets affect firms' fundraising capability (Hall 2002) . Financing innovation and its related market failure are clearly an issue within the framework of innovation systems, but the broad question of financing innovation activity has not been treated holistically, although several authors have indicated that the financial innovation system underlying national and technological innovation systems is a significant driver of innovation activity and should therefore include well-coordinated policies (Dahlstrand & Cetindamar 2000; O'Sullivan 2006; Perez 2013; Wonglimpiyarat 2011) . Private finance is highlighted as a critical factor in particular in the context of a transition towards ecoinnovation (Leete et al. 2013; Mathews et al. 2010; Perez 2013) .
Within the innovation policy mix that is created to enable this transition, different policy instruments are implemented (see Borrás & Edquist 2013 for a generic overview of innovation policy instruments), of which economic transfers comprising different forms of finance is one.
Different phases of the innovation process, i.e. basic and applied R&D, demonstration and commercialisation, pre-commercial phases, niche-market and the supported commercial as well as the fully commercial phase call for different forms of finance, the so-called finance chain of innovation (Auerswald & Branscomb 2003) . In the basic and applied R&D phases, governments use subsidies and grants to address underinvestment in R&D that is risky due to intangibility and the limited extent to which it can be appropriated in terms of tangible returns to the firm (Link & Scott 2010; Dahlstrand & Cetindamar 2000) .
When the commercialisation phases (demonstration, pre-commercial, niche-market and supported commercial) are reached -when 'investment readiness' is proved by signalling the quality of the business proposition linked to the emerging technology -external financiers such as business shortcomings, such as the need to have a well-functioning equity market and a focus upon only certain industries at a time, that make them unsuitable for investing in infrastructure, larger R&D projects or asset-heavy firms and projects (Hall & Lerner 2010; Oakey 2003; Hall 2002; Kenney & Hargadon 2012 ). In addition, private equity, mezzanine and bank finance are often not available because of lack of collateral or the overall level of risk relating to the technologies and the institutional environment (Ughetto 2010 (Ughetto , 2007 . More mature firms often rely on internal funds; however, as commercial viability is often uncertain, these companies refrain from commercialisation activities. In many cases, this leaves structural holes (e.g. known as the 'valley of death') in the commercialisation phase, since private equity, many VCs and credit financiers are often unable to seamlessly invest either in companies that reach the end of the public R&D support phase or in complementary assets such as the infrastructure required for commercialisation (Auerswald & Branscomb 2003) . Consequently, this can lead to thin financial markets as difficulties arise in the supply of, and demand for, finance. Simply increasing demand or supply is not sufficient, as coordination problems often arise between innovators (e.g. entrepreneurs), financiers and government (Nightingale et al. 2009; Dahlstrand & Cetindamar 2000) . Policymakers could therefore systematically strengthen the market-demand side by establishing public procurement programs or public-private research partnerships in order to strengthen the technological capability to support the supply side (Audretsch & Lehmann 2004; Auerswald & Branscomb 2003; Edquist & Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012; Hargadon 2010; Link & Scott 2010) .
In later stages of the innovation cycle (supported commercial and fully commercial), (clean) technologies face regulatory risks, flawed market pricing mechanisms or policy coordination failures (Weber & Rohracher 2012; Haley & Schuler 2011; Foxon et al. 2005) . In this situation, governments could provide incentives to the financial sector and play a catalytic role in providing risk capital. This could be done by regulating certain industries, setting up institutions to make investments more profitable (Borrás & Edquist 2013; Wonglimpiyarat 2011) or using direct instruments such as public procurement for innovation (Edler & Georghiou 2007; Edquist & Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012; Guerzoni & Raiteri 2014 ). An overview of instruments used to finance innovation is provided in Table 1 . 
The role of intermediaries in addressing financial barriers
One way to address the obstacles and structural financial barriers in the innovation cycle (see Table   1 ) is to have intermediaries between different actors (Howells 2006 (Jacobsson & Karltorp 2013; Jacobsson & Bergek 2011; Bergek et al. 2008 ). This broad finance mobilisation function is further differentiated along the innovation cycle, as innovation intermediaries may execute different, more specific finance mobilisation functions and connect to different finance sources along the different innovation phases (see Table 2 ). During the basic and applied R&D phases, which exhibit high technological and market uncertainty and a general underinvestment in R&D, innovation intermediaries help to find new sources of capital for researchers, such as R&D programs, research grants and subsidies. Especially in publicprivate partnership (PPP) constellations concerning the development of complex innovations such as eco-innovations with a highly uncertain outcome, a more active management approach is needed to bring the necessary resources and stakeholders together and reduce development time and costs (Yaqub & Nightingale 2012) . Prior research also points out the relevance of selecting the most suitable finance mechanisms for each type of project (e.g. subsidy, revolving fund, loan and so forth) (Eickelpasch & Fritsch 2005) . The goals of the research efforts need to be aligned with the selection process of supported firms and corresponding financial support mechanisms (Santamaría et al. 2010) . In this regard, intermediaries might also be capable of sending signals to certify the quality of research (Yusuf 2008; Howells 2006) .
During the demonstration and pre-commercial phases, eco-innovations exhibit high capital intensity, challenging scalability, a lack of complementary assets such as infrastructure and demand articulation problems. Here, innovation intermediaries are involved in the distribution of R&D grants and demonstration support (Samila & Sorenson 2010; Brown & Hendry 2009 (Link & Scott 2010; Audretsch et al. 2002; Chang et al. 2002; Lerner 1999) . Clearly, these PPP programs address the underinvestment in R&D and commercialisation; this confirms that firms need financial support to scale up their operations when they have passed the seed and invention stage (Cooper 2003) . Put alternatively, government or government-affiliated entities such as intermediaries 'thicken up thin financial markets' for early stage innovations (Mazzucato 2013; Link & Scott 2010; Nightingale et al. 2009 ).
In the niche-market, supported commercial and fully commercial phases, the role of innovation whom they engage as partners in the innovation process, and they should also be able to deviate from policy lines in view of the need for the 'creative destruction' of existing systems that may be required for system innovation (van Lente et al., 2003) .
Methodology
Research approach
To develop an empirically based perspective in the context of the above-reviewed literature, an exploratory, inductive methodology was applied, since there is limited empirical understanding of the phenomenon and a small number of cases available to further build and refine theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2009 ). Our approach consists of a multiple case study design (six cases of project-managing organisations fulfilling the institutional intermediary role) that generates in-depth knowledge about a complex phenomenon (Patton 2002) . The theoretical understanding (see sections 2.1. and 2.2.) about barriers to eco-innovation along the innovation cycle and possible policy responses functioned here as an initial analytical lens to interpret the empirical findings revealed in an iterative process between theory and findings (Mantere 2008; Patton 2002) . We now further detail the research context, the case selection and data gathering as well as the analytical approach.
Research context
Germany has a strong focus on innovation-led growth, public-private cooperation, comprehensive environmental regulation and a particular financial system, and plays a leading role in conducting a systematic transition towards sustainable energy systems using eco-innovations. These conditions are relevant to describe here as they have consequences for our research design, which focuses on innovation intermediaries' finance mobilisation functions. First, the eco-innovation industry structure, consisting of large firms and small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), is orientated towards leading-edge technologies and therefore has strong ties with universities. These often take the form of PPPs, which require intermediation between public and private entities. Second, the conservative bank-based system focuses on investment banking and project finance, thus lacking an institutionalised finance system (i.e. pension funds and other institutional investors that invest in VC and private equity) as in the UK or the US. Consequently, other forms of financial intermediation are required for services usually provided by VCs in the US and the UK. Third, the strongly mission-driven government that devises proactive public policies to overcome existing lock-ins and path dependency creates a need for intermediation between innovators and policymakers.
Case selection
Policymaking for innovation is carried out by the German federal government and the 16 Länder governments (state governments). R&D activities are conducted by a range of SMEs and larger companies as well as a range of higher education institutions, academies and research organisations (Max-Planck Society, Fraunhofer Society, Helmholtz Association, Scientific Community Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz). Intermediaries between these three parties include the German research foundation, public and private project-managing organisations as well as industry associations and chambers of commerce. Rather than designing a statistically representative sample, we wanted to select cases that are valuable to investigate in light of our research question (Siggelkow 2007) , and thus we applied purposive sampling (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2009 ). Hence, we focus on projectmanaging organisations, as they occupy a critical innovation intermediary position within a broader eco-innovation project context consisting of several organisations, influencing the exchange of different types of resources important to eco-innovation (see Figure 1 ). These public or private corporations gain their mandates from ministries in a competitive process. On the basis of their mandate obtained from the ministry, they can be considered institutional innovation intermediaries that play a critical role in bringing public and private actors together.
Our sample includes six project-managing organisations that manage most of Germany's cooperative R&D projects. They are not solely dedicated to stimulating eco-innovations; however, to study their role in this specific context, we focus on 20 government-supported eco-innovation R&D partnerships at different stages in the innovation cycle (Table 2 ) managed by these organisations. These projects appertain to the German Research for Sustainable Development framework that aims at fostering eco-innovation with a technical focus on energy production and efficiency, mobility and materials, amongst other things. Figure 1 depicts an overview of the research setting. For our study, we contacted leading individuals from all project-managing organisations executing the abovementioned 20 R&D partnerships. The surveyed project managers possess broad knowledge about the ongoing research process and are aware of the regulatory environment. They are also able to establish links between financiers and supported organisations, as they manage relationships consisting of flows of information and finance within R&D projects ( Figure 1 ). An overview of the organisations and individual interview participants can be found in Table 3 . 
Data collection and analysis
In case study methodology, data collection means reconstructing a phenomenon or a case by means of archival data, interviews or other artefacts and gaining understanding based on an analytical lens at the same time (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 2009 Table 1 ). In addition, the financial requirements (€2.5m -€600 m) and the ministries responsible for the partnerships (see Table 3 ) as well as the participating actors (SMEs, MNEs, start-ups, universities, research organisations) differed widely. These descriptions were used in interviews. As a second step, the interviews enabled us to acquire an in-depth understanding of the peculiarities of specific cases. The number of interviewees per unit varied between one and two depending on the organisational setup of the R&D partnership, with a total of 25 interviews (see Table 3 ). We conducted the interviews in sequential order to enable the transfer of insights from each case to an improved interview guide for subsequent cases. Each interview took between one and two hours and was conducted face-to-face or via telephone, with one or two researchers present. The interviews were tape-recorded with the interviewees' approval and transcribed verbatim to ensure correct interpretation. All interviews followed a semi-structured outline, with a set of guiding questions repeated at each interview (see Appendix A.1 for the interview guide). Thirdly, the aggregated findings were discussed, validated and extended during a workshop consisting of 15 study participants and five R&D project managers in similar positions.
The workshop process was also recorded and transcribed.
To infer patterns from the collected data, we employed axial open coding with emerging categories (Dougherty 2002) , guided by an overarching theoretical understanding (Patton 2002) . We used the software MaxQDA 11 for the text analysis and to manage the data. Our initial findings were validated through the workshop on the barriers to eco-innovation, as the workshop participants focused on the financing problems for (eco-) innovations and intermediaries' role therein.
Findings
Using the data from our analysis, we first describe the identified financial barriers to ( In the basic research phase, the R&D project managers highlighted technological barriers such as complexity and administrative barriers such criteria for the selection of projects. These translated directly into constrains regarding funding (i.e. grants), as well as other potential sources of finance for further development. Once the applied R&D phase was entered, the experts stressed the lack of orientation towards commercialisation, both on the private side -such as slow adoption of technologies, a lack of cooperation along the value chain, low corporate R&D -and on the public side, i.e. limited ability to make the technological development process transparent, a lack of links between STI and industrial policy and of public-private interaction (commercial viability or business models for technologies). These barriers relate to a lack of private risk capital (i.e. business angels or VCs) and uncertainty about further public funding for the technologies under development.
Throughout the demonstration and pre-commercial phases the R&D project, managers referred to severe financial barriers on the private side, e.g. capital intensity and a lack of collateral, bankability, insurability, competence problems and too short time horizons for financiers. On the public side, administrative barriers were highlighted, such as a lack of interfaces between phases in the innovation cycle and government bodies and limited opportunities for the intermediaries themselves to address this gap. Finally, institutional barriers such as infrastructure were mentioned.
For the niche-market, the supported commercial and the fully commercial phases, the interviewees perceived a high path dependency on the private side regarding technologies and business models but also high regulatory and political uncertainty and inconsistent support for different technologies (i.e. picking the winner problem) on the public side. Public-private barriers arise from commercialisation efforts being made too early as a result of technology push measures and responding private actors, as well as infrastructure problems. In addition, there is a lack of compatibility between private finance and public support initiatives.
To summarise, from the perspective of institutional innovation intermediaries, these findings indicate that technological, cooperative and political barriers along the innovation cycle translate into financial barriers (see section 2.1.). This translation takes different forms along the innovation cycle. In the early stages, technological and administrative barriers such as an opaque technology development process and uncertainty about the technological and commercial prospects limit the matching with funding sources and thus result in early stage financial constraints. A lack of orientation towards commercialisation including a focus on costs and potential business models and a lack of interfaces between ministries and stages in the innovation cycle, combined with financiers' limited capabilities to evaluate commercial viability, translate into a severe gap for private risk capital during the demonstration and niche-market phases. During the later stages (supported commercial and fully commercial), regulatory and policy uncertainty as well as inconsistent support mechanisms translate into large investment projects and infrastructure being delayed or withdrawn, and this represents a significant financial barrier.
Role of institutional innovation intermediaries in addressing these barriers
Having outlined the perceived technological, cooperative, regulatory or political and corresponding financial barriers, we analysed the role of institutional innovation intermediaries in addressing these barriers and correspondingly mobilising the private finance inhibited by the different barriers.
Competences and mandates regarding commercialisation
Although the intermediaries institutionally fulfil the same position, we found a variety of roles, competences and mandates that impact their functioning within their respective contexts. The surveyed project managers see themselves as experts -a prerequisite for fulfilling the managerial task of the R&D partnerships. Secondly, they act as bridge-builders between critical actors in the innovation system -within the supported R&D projects and the corresponding participants -that address cooperation barriers in the early stages. However, only few explicitly regard themselves as organisations designed to bridge the gap between R&D and commercialisation and address underlying financial, regulatory and technological barriers.
The R&D project managers allocate resources between projects, channelling public funds, selecting participants, and documenting and controlling the process as well as the usage of the generated knowledge (products, processes or patents). Some of them do not see a relevant role for themselves within that process, whereas others have a holistic understanding of their managerial capabilities.
Most surveyed project managers have a broader commercial perspective, and this is supported by the analysis of archival documents for each field. However, only a few directly address barriers such as capital intensity and scalability on the private side and the lack of infrastructure on the public side, as can be seen from the LED lighting example in Box 1.
Box 1: LED Lighting R&D and Lead-market Initiative
The LED has been government supported since its potential for general lighting was discovered at the end of 
Financial instruments and cooperation with financiers
The R&D project managers possess a set of instruments to support the innovation process to address the abovementioned barriers. They include various subsidy schemes, socio-economic research and start-up support schemes, as well as instruments targeting the later stages of the innovation process, e.g. commercialisation, which requires contacts with public or commercial funds. These contacts might take various forms and are seen as a new competence for R&D project managers. Additionally, supporting tools such as roadmaps were highlighted. These tools make the technology development process (including complementary assets such as infrastructure) understandable to third parties and help in coordinating actors.
Other interviewees argue in favour of integrating VC as an instrument for effective support of SMEs and start-ups, to signal quality towards potential financiers. There is often a deficit of external capital, as shown in the example in Box 2 of the smart-grids innovation program (EEnergy). However, information used as a signal for potential financiers or other private actors might be confidential or unavailable in aggregated form. Supplying these data could mean a conflict of interest for the intermediaries. Nonetheless, R&D project managers could provide complementary research to reduce the risks to private financiers. In sum, two possibilities to address financial barriers emerged. The intermediaries could either directly use their instruments to address financial barriers, especially relevant in the case of SMEs, or they could shape the policy environment to address regulatory risks and uncertainty in the later stages in order to provide incentives for larger companies to invest in innovation.
During the workshop, the participants highlighted their systemic perspective and their finance mobilisation functions to address specific structural gaps and financing needs. Two solutions emerged: first, the integration of a market perspective in the design of R&D programs to permit a smooth transition between R&D and commercialisation; second, the use of bridge-building and gatekeeping functions later in the innovation process to provide interfaces between the market participants.
Box 2: Smart-grids Innovation Program (E-Energy)
The smart-grids innovation program aimed to demonstrate the feasibility of using existing and novel ecoinnovations in intelligent model regions. Thus, the initiative focused explicitly at the outset on applied R&D and commercialisation. It specifically addressed SME and start-ups, which have been particularly active in this clean-tech subsector. The project-managing organisation took an innovation management approach, focusing on problems that SME highlighted as barriers to accelerated commercialisation: the lack of business models and the limited access to VC for a quick scale up. They consequently applied instruments such as prizes for founders and a holistic model region approach. The combination of VC and R&D grants as financial instruments has not yet been implemented, although the responsible project manager framed it as a possibility to address financial barriers. Standardisation as a technological barrier was further referred back to the corresponding ministries to be addressed on a regulatory level.
Discussion
The research question guiding our enquiry was: How do institutional innovation intermediaries address the complex set of barriers surrounding (eco-) innovation especially from R&D to commercialisation, with an emphasis on mobilisation of finance?
In this section, we reflect upon this research question and interrogate our findings with previous insights from the literature on innovation finance and on innovation intermediation in order to show the specific role of intermediaries in mobilising finance and how this relates to addressing barriers to eco-innovation.
Addressing financial barriers requires a holistic perspective on the interrelatedness of different kinds of barriers
Due to high public-private uncertainty, R&D complexity and learning in the early stages, (eco-) innovations need increased support, coordination of activities and the development of By bringing together partners from the automobile and gas industry and assisting in developing technologies and business models for infrastructure, the intermediaries could address major technological and institutional barriers that ultimately translate into financial barriers and prevent commercialisation. According to our findings, institutional innovation intermediaries thus possess, or can make linkages to, the instruments that address the underlying financial aspects relating to barriers along the innovation cycle, such as capital intensity, scalability, infrastructure, lock-ins, regulatory risk and policy coordination failures. In the next section, we discuss the key strategies deployed by institutional innovation intermediaries that emerged from our findings.
Unravelling direct and indirect finance mobilisation functions of institutional innovation intermediaries
From our analysis of intermediary roles and instruments, we derived a set of functions that permit institutional innovation intermediaries to influence the finance environment for (clean) technologies and consequently accelerate the commercialisation and diffusion process. Finance mobilisation functions comprise not only strictly financial instruments but also instruments that indirectly influence the finance environment for eco-innovation.
Firstly, classical innovation intermediation functions, such as matchmaking to establish R&D partnerships, adding and removing participants, knowledge brokering to ensure knowledge exchange in R&D partnerships, contract and conflict management, patent brokering and consulting (Howells 2006; Yusuf 2008) , indirectly impact the finance environment. Intermediaries are able to accelerate the commercialisation process by establishing and managing strategic R&D partnerships and by making connections to supportive innovation policy instruments such as roadmaps, strategic public procurement or production support measures, thereby making the technology innovation process more transparent. This contributes to the reduction of uncertainty about future market opportunities (Hoppe & Ozdenoren 2005) . On the basis of these findings, we argue that these instruments used or operationalised by intermediaries influence the quality of the R&D partnership and increase commercial viability, which in turn influences the attractiveness for private financiers to invest in companies and complementary assets.
Secondly, the findings highlight intermediaries' indirect finance mobilisation functions, in that they influence STI policy and regulation surrounding the technologies under development through their advocacy activities, as has already been observed elsewhere (Kivimaa 2014; Klerkx & Leeuwis 2009; van Lente et al. 2003) . In addition to the beneficial effects of adequate STI policy and regulation for innovation and commercialisation, this indicates that support for favourable STI policy mechanisms and regulation directly determines the ability of private investors to invest in young, small and more mature companies. These investments are especially relevant in the context of eco-innovation as these technologies exhibit a strong regulatory dependency and asset heaviness.
The third component of more direct finance mobilisation functions revolves around the cooperation with private financiers to improve their competences regarding innovative (clean) technologies and thus strengthen their ability to evaluate future market opportunities. Reduction of information asymmetries has been highlighted in the context of markets for technologies (between producers and users) (Hoppe & Ozdenoren 2005; Boon et al. 2011) ; through our analysis, we found that it is especially relevant in the context of financing (eco-) innovation since the information asymmetries between financiers and innovators are greater in this area than in others.
Fourth, direct financial instruments represent probably the most obvious part of direct finance mobilisation functions to alleviate financial constraints for innovating firms and research institutes.
These include subsidies, grants, tax credits and support for demonstration projects (Borrás & Edquist 2013; Meuleman & De Maeseneire 2012; Brown & Hendry 2009 ). Our analysis adds to this earlier work by indicating that it is critical to use an adequate and appropriate financial mechanism (public, private or PPP -based on the risk/return profile) to allow a seamless transition between the phases of the innovation cycle. This includes a combination of public (e.g. grants) and private (e.g. VC) instruments in later stages to leverage the publicly invested money.
The synergic combination of direct and indirect finance mobilisation functions of innovation intermediaries
As discussed in sections 5.1. and 5.2., we argue that, in order to address the interwoven barriers highlighted above, innovation intermediaries need to apply different roles and corresponding instruments for each stage of the innovation cycle. We highlight the fact that finance mobilisation functions are critical to support and accelerate the innovation process for eco-innovations by intermediating between public policymakers, private financiers and innovators. From our findings, we derived the model depicted in Figure 2 . Second, as a second-order effect, they accelerate the innovation process by supporting the design of a policy environment that is conducive to the innovation process, spanning from complementary assets towards regulation to indirectly change the finance environment. This finding supports work that argues that, as a whole, finance mobilisation functions could act as a lever for publicly invested money and permit the thickening-up of thin finance markets for (eco-) innovations (Kleer 2010; Nightingale et al. 2009; Meuleman & De Maeseneire 2012) . Our findings reveal that a technologyspecific assessment of policies is necessary to facilitate financing (eco-) innovation. The development of complementary assets (e.g. infrastructure, standards) or research to reduce risks enable private financiers to more seamlessly invest in the commercialisation phase of (clean) technologies and thereby overcome corresponding barriers.
Thirdly, there is a synergy between public and private actors in the sphere of innovation finance, as institutional innovation intermediaries act in a translating, moderating and mediating way between market and non-market actors to support market creation. This form of intermediary complements informed investors (which to some extent may also be considered intermediaries) such as VCs 
Limitations of the study
Since intermediation is a context-dependent phenomenon, we acknowledge limitations to our study.
The study's qualitative nature prevents us from generalising our findings. Nonetheless, the surveyed partnerships represent typical cases for high technology research. Thus, the model based on our findings could be transferred to other forms of organisations or government agencies in other contexts, as the functions remain universal. Organisations that have similar responsibilities and face similar barriers exist in other countries. They include the Department of Energy National Laboratories in the US, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the UK. However, depending on the degree of influence from institutional conditions, i.e. structural R&D support in the national innovation system, the transferability of our findings may be limited. To gain a deeper understanding of the interaction between institutional intermediaries, innovators and financiers, additional studies need to be conducted in other highly uncertain fields of technology.
Conclusion and policy implications
In this study, we show that institutional innovation intermediaries with both their direct and their indirect finance mobilisation functions accelerate the commercialisation and diffusion of (eco-) innovation. Our findings complement earlier work that has been looking at single public and private instruments to finance innovation (Auerswald & Branscomb 2003) , notably research programs and grants (SBIR/ATP) (Link & Scott 2010; Chang et al. 2002) and VC or business angels (Leete et al. 2013; Kenney & Hargadon 2012; Nightingale et al. 2009 ). Our research confirms the utility of individual funding instruments; however, we highlight restrictions of these instruments with regard to their coordination and embeddedness within the overall innovation system and process in order to thicken up the thin financial markets for eco-innovation. This requires a focus on the interfaces between the innovation process stages and their connection with the policy environment. So, coordination of the variety of innovation-financing policy instruments available to institutional innovation intermediaries addresses the void of finance mobilisation functions that results in many technologies failing to transit from research to market (Jacobsson & Karltorp 2013; Mathews et al. 2010; Bergek et al. 2008 ).
Our findings hence provide empirical support for the argument put forward by Wonglimpiyarat  Please describe the public-private cooperation (actors, forms, barriers).
 Please describe the public-public cooperation (actors, forms, barriers). 
Financial
We had good projects which we could not fund due to insufficient budgets.
The industry is not willing to invest. That is critical.
[…] We hear this a lot from our project partners (Research project manager, Solar energy technologies).
We need to find someone who is willing to invest and bear the risk. We need to find someone who is willing to do that in Germany. I do not think that taxpayers will be excited if we fund a German company which establishes its production facility in Asia, the US or elsewhere (Research project manager,
Battery technologies).
The feedback from our demonstration projects, where smart homes are deployed, is that there is only a business case when the pay scale fits the user needs (Research project manager, Smart grids).
R&D 
Knowledge broker
We see ourselves as brokers. We work for the ministries but somehow also for the industry. That means we attempt to bring together different points of view. That is our strength because we are familiar with different sectors. We are in the best sense mediators, and we try to advance the opinions of others rather than our own (Research project manager, Photovoltaics).
Technology transfer
We funded these technology centres for 10 years. There is a lot of know- 
Influence on STI policy
It is not that we dictate something […] . We rather make our point and summarise things, which is already an interpretation. But we also get to know political aspects that we are obliged to include in our evaluation.
[…]
We cannot influence it uni-directionally; we rather help them build their opinion (Research project manager, Geothermal energy).
It is our task to set the stage. We would like to have this technology field and not the other. 
Interfaces between
In any case, we have to answer the question: What comes afterwards? We work for ministry X and fund the research, but we do not work for the We strive for synergies and we try to reduce redundancies. But, after all, the transition from prototype or demonstration, from the R&D phase towards a mainstream product or service is a responsibility of the innovators (Research project manager, Carbody technologies). We could also show that we expect growth in this sector over the next years or that we see a lead-market. We also show the sphere around, saying that these small companies are in a consortium with large firms. We work as a contractor for a certain ministry, selling services to them, precisely giving project funding to the innovators. If we had the industry as a contractor at the same time, I would regard this conflict as critical as long as there is no organisational separation between the two processes (Research project manager, Organic photovoltaics).
Financial instruments
Complementary services
We supply preliminary seismic data according to model calculations, simulations; we are of the opinion that with 95% probability you will find the geologic conditions necessary for an insurer to insure the last 5%
(Research project manager, Geothermal energy).
